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Mill's Intentions and Motives
MICHAEL RIDGE
Australian National University, University of Edinburgh
One might have thought that any right-thinking utilitarian would hold that motives and
intentions are morally on a par, as either might influence the consequences of one's
actions. However, in a neglected passage of Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill claims
that the lightness of an action depends 'entirely upon the intention' but does not at all
depend upon the motive. In this paper I try to make sense of Mill's initially puzzling
remarks about the relative importance of intentions and motives in a way that high-
lights the importance of other elements of his moral philosophy and action theory.
A full appreciation of John Stuart Mill's moral theory requires a proper
understanding of his action theory. For in a puzzling and infrequently
discussed passage in Utilitarianism, Mill claims that there is 'no point
which utilitarian thinkers (and Bentham pre-eminently) have taken
more pains to illustrate than' the distinction between intentions and
motives.1 Mill goes on to claim that while the lightness or wrongness
of an action does not depend upon the agent's motive, it does depend
'entirely upon the intention.' In spite of the apparent importance of
this distinction to his view, Mill does not explicitly return to it in
Utilitarianism. The footnote in which he responds to Rev. J. Llewellyn
Davies is the extent of his discussion of the distinction in that work.
This presents sympathetic interpreters of Mill's moral theory with a
problem. It would seem that for a utilitarian, motives and intentions
are on a par with respect to the Tightness of an action. The most
straightforward understanding of utilitarianism makes the rightness
or wrongness of an action a direct function of its consequences. Either
intentions or motives may have some influence on the consequences of
an action, but there is no obvious reason to suppose that intentions,
but not motives, are especially strongly connected to the consequences
of actions. It is therefore difficult to see why a utilitarian would think
intentions, as opposed to motives, are uniquely important to the right-
ness or wrongness of an action. My aim here is to dissolve this puzzle,
and show why it makes sense for Mill to put special weight on the
intention, but not the motive, with which an action is done.
I
An opponent, whose intellectual and moral fairness it is a pleasure to acknow-
ledge (the Rev. J. Llewellyn Davies), has objected to this passage, saying,
1
 See John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Indianapolis, 1979 [1861], p. 18. The footnote
is one of two footnotes of any substantial length in the entire work, but does not appear
in all contemporary versions of the book (it was added in Mill's second edition).
© Edinburgh University Press 2002 Utilitas Vol. 14, No. 1, March 2002
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'Surely the rightness or wrongness of saving a man from drowning does
depend very much upon the motive with which it is done. Suppose that a
tyrant, when his enemy jumped into the sea to escape from him, saved him
from drowning simply in order that he might inflict upon him more exquisite
tortures, would it tend to clearness to speak of that action as a "morally right
action"? Or suppose again, according to one of the stock illustrations of ethical
inquiries, that a man betrayed a trust received from a friend, because the
discharge of it would fatally injure that friend himself or someone belonging to
him, would utilitarianism compel one to call the betrayal "a crime" as much as
if it had been done from the meanest motive?'
I submit that he who saves another from drowning in order to kill him by
torture afterwards does not differ only in motive from him who does the same
thing from duty or benevolence; the act itself is different. The rescue of the
man is, in the case supposed, only the necessary first step of an act far more
atrocious than leaving him to drown would have been. Had Mr Davies said,
"The rightness or wrongness of saving a man from drowning does depend very
much' - not upon the motive, but - 'upon the intention', no utilitarian would
have differed from him. Mr Davies, by an oversight too common not to be quite
venial, has in this case confounded the very different ideas of Motive and
Intention. There is no point which utilitarian thinkers (and Bentham pre-
eminently) have taken more pains to illustrate than this. The morality of the
action depends entirely upon the intention - that is, upon what the agent wills
to do. But the motive, that is, the feeling which makes him will so to do, if it
makes no difference in the act, makes none in the morality: though it makes a
great difference in our moral estimation of the agent, especially if it indicates
a good or bad habitual disposition - a bent of character from which useful, or
from which hurtful actions are likely to arise.2
This lengthy footnote comes in the context of Mill's having claimed
that utilitarian moralists have 'gone beyond all others in affirming
that the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action,
though much with the worth of the agent'. Reverend Davies presents
Mill's claim with two counter-examples - that of a tyrant who saves
a drowning man simply to torture him and the case of a man who
betrays a trust received from a friend because keeping the trust would
fatally injure that friend or someone dear to him. The idea seems to be
that the tyrant's action is wrong in virtue of his motive while the man
who betrays a trust deserves at least some exculpation in virtue of his
motive. Mill argues that Davies has confused intentions with motives.
According to Mill, the rightness or wrongness depends 'entirely upon
the intention', while the motive, 'if it makes no difference in the act,
makes none in the morality'.
What, though, is the distinction between intentions and motives?
Since Mill refers to Bentham as having given the definitive account
of the distinction, it makes sense to turn to Bentham to see what
Mill has in mind. After all, Bentham devotes an entire chapter of
The Principles of Morals and Legislation to motives (chapter X) and
2
 Ibid., p. 18.
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another chapter to intentions (chapter VIII), and he discusses them
in some detail in numerous other chapters as well. Bentham's most
general characterization of a motive is 'any thing that can contribute
to, give birth to, or even prevent, any kind of action'.3 Bentham then
distinguishes a wide variety of senses of 'motive' and its cognates,
but for present purposes only two of those distinctions are important.
First, there is the distinction between motives as prospects and
motives in esse. A motive as prospect is that posterior to the action to
which the agent looks forward. A motive in esse is an event which
takes place upon a person's anticipating a motive as prospect. Second,
there is the distinction between external and internal motives. An
internal motive is internal in the sense of being a mental: event; in
particular, it is a perception of pleasure or pain which is 'looked upon
as calculated to determine you to act in such or such a manner'. An
external motive is an external event, 'the happening whereof is
regarded as having a tendency to bring about such pleasure or such
pain'.4 Given these distinctions, it is easy to see which of Bentham's
senses of 'motive' fits best with Mill's discussion. Recall Mill's claim
that a motive is a feeling which makes one will something. Since a
motive in Mill's sense causes one to will something, it must not be
posterior to that action and hence must be a motive in esse, rather than
a motive qua prospect. Since a motive in Mill's sense is a feeling, it
clearly is an internal rather than an external motive. So Mill's con-
ception of a motive maps nicely onto Bentham's notion of a internal
motive in esse.
On Bentham's account, our intentions can regard either the action
to be performed itself, or its consequences. This is meant to explain the
way in which an action can be intentional even when its consequences
are not, as when I intend to give my friend some news but do not
realize that the news will upset her, so that I do not intend one of the
consequences of my intentional action.5 More unorthodox is Bentham's
distinction between consequences which are 'directly5 intended and
those which are only 'obliquely5 intended. A consequence is directly
intended when the prospect of that consequence is one of the 'links in
the chain of causes' which led the agent to perform the action. So if the
consideration of some prospective consequence of an action is part of
what motivated me to perform that action, then I directly intended
that consequence. By contrast, a consequence is obliquely intended if
3
 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, New
York, 1948 [1789], p. 97.
4
 Ibid., p. 99.
5
 Bentham also gives an example in which, on his account, the consequences are
intentional though the act is not intentional 'throughout'. See Bentham, p. 83.
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the agent was aware of the consequence but the prospect of that con-
sequence 'did not constitute a link in the aforesaid chain'.6 So if I knew
that hurting my friend was a likely consequence of giving her the
news, but I was not at all motivated by the prospect of hurting her,
then in giving her the news I only obliquely, and not directly, intended
to hurt her.7 It must be admitted that Bentham's notion of oblique
intending is idiosyncratic. Nonetheless, this is rather clearly his mean-
ing, and it would be unhelpful to quarrel over the word.
Does Mill, in the footnote from Utilitarianism, mean by 'intention' to
include both direct and oblique intentions? He refers the reader to
Bentham, which provides some evidence that he does, especially since
he does not bother explicitly to invoke the distinction and say he is only
talking about the one rather than the other. However, the examples
from Revd Davies that Mill is discussing seem compatible with think-
ing that he only has in mind what Bentham would refer to as direct
intentions, especially since this is arguably the more natural under-
standing of'intention'. In the first case, the tyrant rather clearly has a
direct intention to torture the man, as that is what moves him to act.
Presumably, he also has a direct intention to save him as well, as he
intentionally saves the man; of course this direct intention is purely
instrumental, but the direct/oblique distinction cuts across the non-
instrumental/instrumental distinction. It is less clear that his inten-
tion to then torture the man is direct; even though it is an action of his,
it is also understood here as a consequence of the first action, as if it
necessarily follows from the first. One might argue that the tyrant's
intention to torture the man is direct under one description — as an
action of his without reference to its etiology, and indirect under
another description - as a consequence of his directly intended action
of saving the man. The second case Davies provides is considerably
less clear, since the nature of the fatal injury which would befall the
person's friend if he breaks his trust is left open.
Fortunately, we have independent evidence that Mill understands
'intention' as including direct and indirect intentions. In commenting
on Chapter XXV, 'Intention', of his father's (James Mill's), Analysis of
the Human Mind (John Stuart), Mill remarks that,
6
 Ibid., p. 84.
7
 Oddly, Bentham characterizes the direct/oblique distinction as a distinction falling
only within the category of intended consequences, but it seems straightforward and
plausible enough to extend that distinction to intended actions themselves. If the real-
ization that my action falls under a particular description - an insult, say - motivates
me to perform the action, then the action is directly intentional under that description.
If, by contrast, I am aware that my action falls under that description but am not at
all motivated by that fact, then the action is only obliquely intentional under that
description.
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Intention, when we are said to intend the consequences of our actions, means
the foresight, or expectation of those consequences, which is a totally different
thing from desiring them. The particular consequences in question, though
foreseen, may be disagreeable to us: the act may be done for the sake of other
consequences. Intention, and motive, are two very different things. But it is
the intention, that is, the foresight of consequences, which constitutes the
moral lightness or wrongness of the act. Which among the many consequences
of a crime, are those, foresight of which constitutes guilt, and non-foresight
entitles to acquittal, depends upon the particular nature of the case. We may
say generally, that it is the hurtful consequences.8
In this passage Mill not only explicitly embraces Bentham's very broad
notion of intention, he also explicitly connects his embracing that
notion to his claim that it is the intention, but not the motive, 'which
constitutes the moral Tightness or wrongness of the act'. This makes
the conclusion that it is this sense of 'intention' that Mill had in mind
in the footnote in Utilitarianism in which he makes this very same
claim almost irresistible.
At this point, we have some idea of how Mill understands the
distinction between intentions and motives. An intention is either
an agent's aiming to do something, or the agent's foreseeing a con-
sequence of what the agent aim to do.9 To aim to do something, in this
sense, one must not simply desire to do it but must also be committed
to doing it, which will at the very least involve not seeing it as beyond
one's control.10 A motive, by contrast, is a feeling, and such feelings
may (though they need not, and do not, always do so) cause one to
intend to bring about that state of affairs, the contemplation of which
gives one the feeling. A more intuitive way of putting this point would
be to say that such feelings may cause one to aim to bring about the
intentional object of the feeling, but Mill does not clearly think that
feelings have intentional objects. He may very well follow Hume in
supposing that they are 'original existences,' having no intentional
objects.11
Mill's language is admittedly a bit strained here, in that he seems
to equate 'intending" with 'willing' and it does seem odd to claim that
someone wills something when she merely foresees it as a consequence
of her action.12 Still, this pretty clearly seems to be what Mill has in
8
 Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. John Robson, Toronto, 1961-91, xxxi. 252 f.
9
 In the footnote in question, Mill actually says that the intention is Svhat the agent
wills,' making an intention an external state of affairs rather than a mental state, but
presumably he would simply distinguish intentions qua what is intended from inten-
tions qua acts of intending.
10
 It may require the stronger condition that you see it as, to some degree, within your
control.
" David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch,
2nd edn., Oxford, 1978 [1739], bks. I and II.
12
 Thanks to Jonathan Dancy for useful discussion here.
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mind. Nor is Mill's language completely counter-intuitive anyway. For
if one is aware of some consequence of one's action and still wills the
action then it is intuitive to claim that one is Villing to allow that
consequence to happen,' which is not a million miles from claiming
that one wills the consequence. Fortunately, whether Mill's language
fits especially well with ordinary language is not really crucial to his
position so long as the theory he intends is plausible when properly
interpreted. Having now a reasonably clear picture of the distinction
Mill is drawing, we are in a better position to see why he goes on to say
that intentions, but not motives, 'entirely determine' the lightness of
an agent's action.
II
Mill does give us one clue as to why he draws this connection between
an agent's intentions and the lightness or wrongness of her action.
He tells us that when the intention differs, 'the act itself is different'.
This suggests the following account.13 Before we determine whether a
given action is right or wrong, we need to know just what action is in
question. Hence, determining the lightness of a given action requires
having some way of individuating actions. Mill's suggestion seems to
be that actions should be individuated, at least in part, in terms of
their intentions. On this account, if an agent had acted with different
intentions, she would have performed a different action. By contrast,
Mill is suggesting, we should not individuate actions in terms of
the motives which give rise to the intentions. If the intentions and the
external bodily movements (or, in the case of a mental action, the train
of thought, etc.) remain the same, we have the same action.14 In the
case of the tyrant, Mill's idea seems to be that the relevant action is a
complex whole - the action of rescuing one's enemy in order to torture
and kill him.16 This seems to be the relevant action in the case because
the agent intends this combination (actually, the case is arguably
underdescribed on this score, but we can assume that Mill intended
this reading). Whereas if the agent had intended to rescue his enemy
and reform him, the action might not be wrong. On this account,
13
 Though there are other ways of reading this sentence (for some discussion, see
Jonathan Dancy, 'Mill's Puzzling Footnote,' Utilitas xii (2000), 220), I think the account
offered in the text makes the most sense, all things considered.
14
 This interpretation receives further support from a passage in Mill's A System of
Logic: 'Now what is an action? Not one thing, but a series of two things: the state of mind
called a volition, followed by an effect. The volition or intention to produce the effect,
is one thing; the effect produced in consequence of the intention is another thing; the
two together constitute the action.' (Mill, A System of Logic, London, 1875, bk. 1, ch. Iii,
sect. 5.)
15
 Jonathan Dancy advocates a similar reading of the tyrant case. See Dancy, 221.
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motives can at best be indirectly relevant to the individuation of actions
by having an influence on the agent's intentions, whereas intentions
provide constitutive grounds for the individuation of actions.
This certainly is part of what Mill has in mind, but it cannot be the
full story. It is true that we need some way of individuating actions,
and that doing it in terms of the agent's intentions is one way of doing
so. The problem is that it is obviously not the only way of individuat-
ing actions. We could instead take a more coarse-grained approach,
and individuate actions in terms of bodily movements. On this more
coarse-grained approach, someone who goes through exactly the same
external bodily movements as me performs the same action as me,
even if he or she has wildly different intentions. Or we could take a
more fine-grained approach, individuating actions in terms of external
bodily movements, intentions, and motives. On this account, a differ-
ence in motives which cause the intentions will entail that we have
different actions, even if the intentions are identical. Or we could indi-
viduate actions in terms of external bodily movements and the feelings
that gave rise to them. Why should we favour Mill's approach over
these alternatives? Mill could respond by claiming that actions are just
defined in terms of intentions but not motives, but such a stipulative
answer hardly does justice to the force of the question. For the question
can then be reformulated in terms of why that particular definition is
the one we should embrace for purposes of moral theory.16 Moreover,
the question is especially pressing for a utilitarian. Intuitively, utili-
tarianism makes the lightness of an action a direct function of its
consequences. An agent's intentions may, in a given case, have some
effect on the consequences of her action. However, an agent's motives
may also, in a given case, have some effect on those consequences. For
example, if I give to charity simply because I am motivated by greed
and a contemplation of tax benefits, and if others can perceive this,
my acting from those motives may have significant consequences - it
might set a bad example. In terms of what is important to a utilitarian
- promoting good consequences - motives and intentions seem to be on
a par.
16
 An analogy might help make this point more clear - there are different ways we
might go about individuating books. Suppose the only thing on my desk is a copy of
Hume's Treatise of Human Nature. On one way of individuating books, there are three
books on my desk, since the Treatise is divided into three books. On another way of indi-
viduating books, there is only one book on my desk, since the Treatise is itself just one
book. Either way of individuating books seems reasonable, so long as we are clear about
which we are using - nothing much needs hang on which way we go. However, Mill is
going to make whether an agent performs an action which is right (or which is wrong)
hang upon individuating actions in terms of intentions, but not in terms of motives.
Since it is quite significant whether we end up saying that an agent performed a right
action (or that she performed a wrong action), we need an account of why we should indi-
viduate actions, and hence attribute lightness and wrongness, as Mill suggests.
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The key to dissolving this puzzle is first to see what Mill means in
calling an action right or wrong. Utilitarians typically are understood
as defining right action as an action, of those available to the agent,
which maximizes aggregate happiness, while wrong action is defined
as any of the other actions available to the agent. Mill comes close to
endorsing these definitions in chapter II, where he notes that 'the
creed which accepts as the foundation of morals "utility" or "the great-
est happiness principle" holds that actions are right in proportion as
they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to promote the
reverse of happiness'.17 However, the characterization of right and
wrong action in chapter II is a rough and ready account meant to get
the general idea of utilitarianism across; it does not represent Mill's
most refined and considered view of the concepts of morally right and
morally wrong action. For his considered view of those concepts, we
must turn to chapter V of Utilitarianism. The primary aim of chapter
V of Utilitarianism is to deal with the apparent problem that utili-
tarianism conflicts with justice. In the course of dealing with that
objection, Mill also presents in a rather unequivocal manner his
account of what it is for someone to be under a duty. To be under a duty
is intuitively to be obligated in some way to do something. Mill argues
that we can capture this notion of duty in terms of one's being right-
fully compelled to fulfil it. Importantly, a given action might be recom-
mended by considerations of utility - it might maximize aggregate
happiness - but not be something that the agent is under a duty to do,
simply because it would not maximize aggregate happiness for his or
her community to adopt laws, conventions or other practices which
punish people for not performing such actions. In this context, Mill dis-
tinguishes the expedient actions - those which maximize aggregate
utility and hence are recommended by utilitarianism and ought to be
done - from the morally required actions - those which are such that
an agent ought to be compelled to perform them.18 Finally, Mill argues
that justice is a proper subset of the morally required - he argues that
only those requirements crucial to any kind of flourishing community,
and that involve rights, are requirements of justice.19 In articulating
the distinction between what is recommended by expedience and what
is morally required, Mill offers the following definitions of 'right' and
'wrong1:
17
 Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 7.
18
 Mill seems to suppose that the morally required is a proper subset of the expedient,
but this would require some argument. For present purposes, I overlook this subtlety.
For useful discussion, see John Skorupski, John Stuart Mill, London, 1989, p. 324.
19
 For a discussion of some problems with Mill's claim that duties involving rights are
all duties of justice, see David Lyons, Rights, Welfare, and Mill's Moral Theory, New
York, 1994.
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For the truth is that the idea of penal sanction, which is the essence of law,
enters not only into the conception of injustice, but into that of any kind of
wrong. We do not call anything wrong unless we mean to imply that a person
ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it - if not by law, by
the opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his
own conscience. This seems the real turning point of the distinction between
morality and simple expediency ... there is no doubt that this distinction lies
at the bottom of the notions of right and wrong; that we call any conduct
wrong, or employ, instead, some other term of dislike or disparagement,
according as we think that the person ought, or ought not, to be punished for
it; and we say it would be right to do so and so, or merely that it would be desir-
able or laudable, according as we would wish to see the person whom it
concerns compelled, or only persuaded and exhorted, to act in that manner.20
Mill's considered view, then, is that to call an action right is to say that
it ought to be compelled and to call an action wrong is to say that its
performance ought to be punished - either by the state, one's fellows,
or one's own conscience. Rightness and wrongness are reduced to 'to-
be-compelledness' and 'to-be-punishedness' where these claims bottom
out in appeals to the utility of the relevant practices of compulsion and
punishment.21 That these claims bottom out in appeals to utility is not,
20
 Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 47.
21
 Filling in the details of this account in a way that makes the resulting view plaus-
ible is no trivial task. For the question naturally arises as to whether we should call an
action wrong on the grounds that an ideal set of rules would prohibit it, and call for
punishment of the agent, or whether some non-ideal set of rules is the relevant one. If
we favour ideal rules then Mill's analysis warrants a charge of implausible utopianism.
Perhaps in an ideal world there would be a rule requiring nations never to go to war but
this would hardly make it plausible to suppose that in the actual world, where no such
rule is in play, that it would always be wrong to go to war. Fred Berger has made a simi-
lar point against the idealized reading; see Fred Berger, Happiness, Justice, and Free-
dom, Berkeley, 1984, p. 112. Interestingly, structurally similar charges are often brought
against Kant; see Thomas E. Hill, Jr., 'Kant's Utopianism', Akten des 4. Internationalen
Kant-Kongresses, Mainz, Dordrecht, Holland, 1972, pp. 307-15, repr. in his Dignity and
Practical Reason, Ithaca, 1992. The basic problem in each case seems to be a failure to
distinguish what Rawls refers to as ideal theory from non-ideal theory. If, however, we
are not to analyse rightness and wrongness in terms of ideal rules then it is unclear
which of the many possible non-ideal rules are the appropriate ones and why they are
appropriate in the case at hand. The only obviously salient candidate would be whatever
rules are actually in play, but that would be unduly conservative, making it impossible
to criticize existing practices on moral grounds (as opposed to grounds of expedience).
Further, switching away from rules which would be ideal in the circumstances seems
to lose the sense in which one really ought to be punished, since the 'ought' is neither
the maximizing 'ought' of expedience nor the 'ought' of morality, if we assume those are
distinct 'ought's. Mill seems to need a middle-ground position here, according to which
we always take some of our present practices to be justified to some significant degree
though any one of them could in principle be called into question. For useful discussion
of this sort of holistic interpretation of Mill on this point, see Skorupski, pp. 318-20. The
problem is a very tangled one, and I lack the space here to try to resolve it. My suspicion,
however, is that a greater emphasis on the rules of one's own conscience, over which
one has relatively direct control, would make it considerably easier to defend the ideal
conception without falling prey to objections of utopianism. In this respect, I am in full
agreement with David Lyons, who also argues that greater emphasis should be placed
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however, an analytic truth for Mill, as I read him. One gets that conclu-
sion only when one adds as a substantive premise that the principle of
utility is the correct principle of expedience, accurately characterizing
what is worth promoting for its own sake.22
Granted that this is Mill's considered view, one might reasonably
worry whether it is what he had in mind in chapter II, and in particu-
lar in the footnote in which he responds to Revd Davies. For now I want
to bracket that worry, and see how Mill's account would fare if this
were what he meant in chapter II. I shall argue that if this were what
Mill meant by 'morally right' and 'morally wrong" in that footnote, it
would be easy to make sense of Mill's position. Let us suppose that
Mill's response to Revd Davies rests on the thesis that, in determining
whether an action should be punished or compelled, we should indi-
viduate actions in terms of intentions, rather than motives.23 From a
upon the sanctions of conscience, though I disagree with the details of his proposal (see
the following footnote).
22
 For a defence of this way of sorting out what is analytic and what is not in Mill,
see David Lyons, Rights, Welfare, and Mill's Moral Theory. In elaborating this view,
however, Lyons attributes a view to Mill which seems to me to be unwarranted. Lyons
distinguishes himself from D. G. Brown, who claims that Mill's view was that it is
analytic that any action which is wrong is one which merits some sort of external sanc-
tion. See D. G. Brown, 'Mill on Liberty and Morality,' Philosophical Review, lxxxi (1972).
I fully agree with Lyons on this point. Lyons, however, goes on instead to attribute to
Mill the view that 'wrongness is conceptually connected with justified guilt feelings, but
only contingently or synthetically connected with external sanctions' (Lyons, p. 130).
The text instead seems to suggest that Mill did think there was an analytic connection
between wrongness and external sanctions, though certainly not the strong one
advocated by Brown, according to which the appropriateness of external sanctions is
necessary for an action's counting as wrong. Rather, Mill seems to have thought that it
was a conceptual truth that the appropriateness of external sanctions was sufficient,
though not necessary, for an action to count as wrong. More specifically, he held that the
concept of wrongness is disjunctive (though the disjuncts obviously have something in
common - we need not suppose it is disjunctive in some non-natural way): an action is
wrong if and only if either (a) external sanctions (legal or non-legal) ought to be applied
to it, or (b) internal sanctions ought to be applied to it. Mill's chapter V definition is itself
explicitly disjunctive in form (to be wrong is to be such that one ought to be punished 'in
some way or other for it'). It is also true, as Lyons no doubt would emphasize, that cases
in which external but not internal sanctions are very rare indeed, but they do not seem
to be impossible, and we can even imagine circumstances in which they might be rela-
tively common. I see no reason to suppose that Mill would hesitate to call such at least
possible actions wrong, given his explicit definition of wrongness, anyway.
23
 Roger Crisp makes a very similar suggestion in his commentary on Mill's Utili-
tarianism (Oxford, 1998). Crisp remarks that, 'these claims about intention are best
interpreted as advice about when to blame and praise agents, rather than as attempts
to offer a "standard of morals'" (Crisp, p. 122). Crisp does not, however, argue for this
plausible interpretative suggestion. In effect, I am trying to vindicate Crisp's claim that
Mill has in mind the appropriateness of blame and praise in this passage, though I
would (on at least some readings) dissent from Crisp's claim that this is to be opposed to
an attempt to offer a 'standard of morals'. For on my reading Mill would hold that to give
an account of when blame/praise is appropriate is, in one sense, to give a standard
of morals. This standard is, admittedly, based on the principle of utility, the concept of
a duty, and various empirical hypotheses and so is a derivative standard. So if by
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utilitarian perspective, deterrence is the primary rationale for punish-
ment. Consider whether punishing someone for an unintentional con-
sequence would further this goal. We need to separate two kinds of
cases, cases of negligence and other cases. Take first the cases where
there is no negligence. An agent took due care and was in no way negli-
gent, but was nonetheless totally unaware that a consequence of her
action would be that an innocent person would die. In this sort of case
it is plausible to suppose that punishing the person will not further the
general aim of deterring the criminal and others from engaging in such
crimes. For, by stipulation, the agent already took due care and was
not negligent, so it is not as if we need to give her an incentive to be
more careful in the future. Nor is there any sense to be made of the
idea that we are giving her an incentive not unwittingly to cause the
deaths of innocent people. There is no way you can have a direct incen-
tive not to do anything unwittingly, since by stipulation you would be
unwitting of what you are doing. We can, at most, give a person an
incentive to take steps to avoid being unwitting of certain con-
sequences of her actions, but we have already seen that this is not
necessary in the case at hand; by stipulation, the agent was not negli-
gent - she already shows due care and does not need to be more care-
ful in the future (at least, for all we know about her in virtue of this
particular case, she does not need such an incentive). So in the case of
the non-negligent person, punishment would not further the general
utilitarian aims which justify punishment. Moreover, punishment
obviously would inflict some harm on the person we punish, so if no
such justification is forthcoming, the proper conclusion is that punish-
ing people for their unintentional crimes, when they are not negligent
is, as a general practice anyway, not justified.24
Here, of course, it is very important that in Mill's sense what one
intends includes what one foresees but does not act for the sake of.
In the more usual sense of 'intend', one might not intend some con-
sequence but full well know that it is a consequence of one's action, and
in that sense of 'intend' (the sense at work in the 'Doctrine of Double
'standard of morals' Crisp had in mind the ultimate standard of morality (and he prob-
ably does) then he is right that Mill is not trying to do that here, and we do not disagree.
I labour this point only because I think it is important to make sense of the fact that Mill
does claim in the text that the intention entirely determines the morality of the action.
24
 This is, at any rate, Jeremy Bentham's argument in Principles, ch. XIII, 10—11,
against strict liability, and there is no obvious reason to suppose Mill disagrees with it.
I do not mean to imply that the argument is sound. One might reasonably worry that it
overlooks (1) the general deterrent effects of such punishments, and (2) the possible
general benefit of people choosing not to engage in activities they cannot guarantee will
not have consequences for which they might be held liable. Since my primary aim here
is the exegetical one of making sense of Mill's view, I need not worry over whether
Bentham's argument, which I strongly suspect Mill would endorse, is in fact sound.
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Effect' literature) it is true that punishing people for unintended (but
foreseen) consequences could serve to deter actions with those con-
sequences. So the unorthodox conception of'intention' at work in Mill,
as including Bentham's 'oblique' intentions, is important to keep in
mind at this point. It would, however, miss the point to quarrel over
whether this unorthodox notion of 'intend' fits well with ordinary
language. For the point is that 'intention' in this context might even be
a quasi-technical term, which is meant to serve a role in a theory - the
role of picking out the mental state(s) which are relevant to appro-
priate blame and punishment. If the term has a different meaning in
ordinary language, that would not undermine a theory which used the
term in this somewhat unorthodox way, so long as its meaning was
clearly specified. This leaves us with the case in which a person unwit-
tingly causes some bad consequence in which the person is unwitting
of the bad consequence due to negligence of some sort. In this case, the
agent's intentions may turn out to be irrelevant to whether they are
punished, but we cannot know this in advance of individuating the
action. Hence we should individuate actions in terms of intentions,
rather than motives, and deal with cases of negligence as they arise.
So far we have seen how a utilitarian might plausibly argue that
individuating actions in terms of intentions makes sense when trying
to decide which actions are right and which are wrong, where 'right'
and 'wrong' are understood as meaning 'worthy of compulsion' and
'worthy of punishment'. This leaves open the possibility that we should
individuate actions in terms of intentions and motives, but Mill rejects
this approach. What utilitarian grounds could he have for rejecting it?
Reflection upon the likely consequences of a set of conventions which
do individuate actions in this way, and those that do not, illustrates
how such an argument might go. Let us call the rules that a society
would be justified on utilitarian grounds in legally enforcing regard-
less of the agent's motives that society's L-Rules. The question, then,
is whether the L-Rules should, in individuating actions, be extended to
take into account the agent's motives as well. There are at least two
ways in which we might do this. First, we might change the rules
so that they call for punishing someone even when they follow the
L-Rules but when they follow them from a bad motive or fail to follow
them from a good motive (where what counts as a good or bad motive
is given a utilitarian gloss). Second, we might extend the rules so that
they do not require the punishment of those who knowingly break the
L-Rules from a good motive. Under the first scheme in which motives
are made relevant to whether someone should be punished, then
Kant's famous shopkeeper, who gives correct change simply to maxi-
mize profits but not from duty, might be punished even though he
follows the letter of the law. Our natural reaction to such a legal
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scheme is that it is unjust, but for a utilitarian this would be beside the
point if such a scheme would be optimific.
Consider what we might gain in the way of utility by adopting a
scheme in which people are punished for their motives as well as their
actions, and then turn to the costs such a scheme would impose. The
only apparent benefit of such a system when compared with the more
usual system of punishing someone just in case she breaks the com-
munity's L-Rules and regardless of her motives, is that there would be
a somewhat greater incentive for people to acquire good motives and
thereby avoid such punishment. However, there is already a strong
incentive for people to acquire such motives, in so far as doing so is
quite often necessary simply to be reliable at obeying the community's
L-Rules understood independently of motives. In so far as people are
rational and self-aware, the main people who would be given a further
incentive to acquire such motives would be those who are reliable
followers of the L-Rules in spite of having bad motives, but it is not at
all clear what advantage there is in getting such people to adopt good
motives - by hypothesis they obey the relevant rules anyway. There
may be some marginal utility in giving such people a further incentive.
For example, they might become more likely to be nice to people in
cases in which the L-Rules do not require anything, though they might
just as easily become more nasty in such cases having focused all their
positive energy into following the L-Rules from good motives. So it
would seem that the benefits of such a scheme are, at best, speculative
and modest.
By contrast, there are apparently some not so speculative and poten-
tially enormous costs associated with any such scheme. First, it would
divert considerable resources from other, potentially more productive,
outlets. Determining someone's motives in a given case will be very
difficult and require a non-trivial investment of resources, as will the
need to punish more people, at least at first. Indeed, given that almost
anyone sometimes does the right thing for the wrong reason, it might
seem that such a system would, if fully and ideally implemented,
incarcerate or perhaps in some more informal way punish almost
the entire population! Second, such a system might encourage fraud,
threats, corruption, and witch-hunts. Given the subjectivity and un-
certainty involved in the determination of a person's motives, people
may be more likely to lodge frivolous complaints against people who
most likely did not act from bad motives or fail to act from good ones.
Third, the increase in punishment is, for a utilitarian, itself bad in so
far as it causes pain or prevents pleasure for those punished. Fourth,
such a scheme would in almost any imaginable context be vastly
unpopular, reducing respect for the law and conventions of morality in
general. Fifth, there is a danger of tyranny involved in giving too much
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power to the state, as such a scheme seems to do. Mill, of course, is
quite sensitive to this kind of worry, remarking, for example, that we
are not without reason 'afraid of trusting the magistrate with so
unlimited an amount of power over individuals'.25 Sixth, even if such a
system did not degenerate into outright tyranny, there is reason to
suppose that it is not in general a good idea to have the law 'interfere
with the whole detail of private life'.26 Indeed, On Liberty is rife with
arguments for this conclusion. In light of these considerations and
the seemingly negligible and speculative benefits of such a scheme, the
utilitarian is justified in thinking that we ought not adopt a scheme
which individuates actions in terms of motives.
What about making motives relevant in the other way suggested
above - not by punishing people for bad motives, but by not punishing
them so long as they have good motives? It would seem equally appar-
ent, upon reflection, that such a system is unlikely to maximize utility,
once again granting certain relatively uncontroversial empirical
assumptions. What benefit would there be in such a system? There
would presumably be fewer people punished, which is good on utili-
tarian grounds, given that punishment reduces the happiness of the
punished. Other than this there is no apparent benefit to such a
system. There are, however, considerable costs. First, there would
again be the diversion of resources inherent in sorting out people's
motives, which almost certainly would be greater than the savings in
reduced costs of incarceration. Second, such a system would presum-
ably reduce the deterrent effect of punishment substantially, as you
could hope to do the wrong thing but convince a jury, or those people
who might impose more informal, private sanctions against you, that
you did it from a good motive. Further, there is the need to deter moral
fanatics who are wrongly convinced that morality requires something
perverse, say, that they exterminate the members of some despised
minority group. Such a person might believe that exterminating
others would maximize utility, in which case their intention is such
that if their belief was not formed in a negligent way (hard to imagine
in this particular case unless the subject is mentally impaired) they
would not be punished even by the kind of conventions Mill would
defend. However, they need not think that the killing of the members
of the relevant minority group would maximize utility; they might
simply believe that it is good in itself in some perverse way. Such
people may very well be acting from a good motive, in the sense that
their motive is to do what is morally right, though they happen to have
Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 47.
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a false view of what morality demands.27 It would seem that not
punishing such people, and thereby deterring such fanatics could have
deeply dangerous consequences. Indeed, in An Examination of Sir
William Hamilton's Philosophy, Mill is keen to emphasize how it 'is
impossible to assert the justice of punishment for crimes of fanaticism,
on any other ground than its necessity for the attainment of a just end.
If that is not a justification, there is no justification'.28 Mill takes it as
given that such fanatics ought to be punished and argues that utili-
tarianism provides the only plausible explanation of this judgement.
Indeed, Mill cites his father's views with approval here in a way that
is very revealing of his hostility to making punishment sensitive to
motives for just this sort of reason:
He [James Mill] regarded as an aberration of the moral standard of the
modern times, compared with that of the ancients, the great stress laid upon
feeling. Feelings, as such, he considered to be no proper objects of praise
or blame. Right and wrong, good and bad, he regarded as qualities solely of
conduct - of acts and omissions; there being no feeling which may not lead, and
does not frequently lead, either to good or bad actions; conscience itself, the
very desire to act right, often leading people to act wrong. Consistently carry-
ing out this doctrine, that the object of praise and blame should be the discour-
agement of wrong conduct and the encouragement of right, he refused to let
his praise or blame be influenced by the motive of the agent.29
Third, a scheme making punishment sensitive to motives in this way
is likely to be unpopular in virtue of the widespread belief that these
first two considerations are sound, undermining respect for the law
and morality.
It seems, then, that Mill is on safe ground in assuming that our
jurisprudential practices should individuate actions in terms of in-
tentions rather than motives. Not only does common sense affirm
this conclusion, it can be given a powerful utilitarian justification. My
argument has focused on external (legal and informal), rather than
internal sanctions (of conscience), but this is fine. For on Mill's defi-
nition it is sufficient for an act to be wrong that it is appropriately
punished, and it is sufficient for an act to be right that it is appro-
priately compelled. Hence to determine whether an action is right or
wrong it is always relevant to determine the agent's intentions; other-
wise we could not be sure that it does not fall under some appropriate
possible legal rule. This is perfectly compatible with allowing that
being appropriately subjected to internal sanctions is also sufficient
27
 Though this is perhaps a strained sense of 'good motive', given the dangerousness
of moral fanatics. Thanks to Jonathan Dancy for discussion here.
28
 CW, ix. 461 f.
29
 Autobiography, CW, i. 51. Thanks to an anonymous referee for bringing this very
helpful passage to my attention.
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for an action's being wrong. A problem would arise for my interpret-
ation only if the appropriateness of internal sanctions was sensitive to
motives. Fortunately, the many (if not all of the) arguments rehearsed
above against making motives relevant in the case of external sanc-
tions have relatively obvious analogues in the case of internal sanc-
tions as well, and I have focused on the external case only for ease
of exposition. For example, resource-diversion is still an issue, since a
person's own motives are famously not transparent even to the agent
herself. Also, the risk of rationalization would be increased if people
could avoid the pangs of conscience by convincing themselves simply
that their motives were pure in spite of their bad intentions. So if we
read the chapter V definitions of 'right' and 'wrong* back into chapter
II, then we have a plausible explanation of why Mill would say what
he does say.
My suggestion, not surprisingly, is that we should read the chapter
V definitions of 'right' and 'wrong5 back into the discussion of inten-
tions and motives in chapter II. This interpretation seems justified
on at least three grounds. First, and most importantly for present
purposes, it seems the only apparent way to make Mill's overall view
on motives and intentions intelligible, so charity speaks in favour of
this interpretation. Second, it is only in chapter V that we really get
Mill's considered and more refined view - the characterization of right-
ness and wrongness at the beginning of chapter II is deliberately
rough and meant only to give the reader the general idea of utili-
tarianism. There is no apparent reason to think that in the discussion
of intentions and motives Mill would not have relied upon his more
considered view.30 Third, there are Mill's previously quoted remarks on
his father's discussion of intentions. That is the only other context (of
which I am aware) in which Mill makes exactly the same point about
Tightness and wrongness always depending only upon the agent's
intention and not upon his motive, and right after he makes this point
in that context he immediately moves (within the same paragraph and
in the very next sentence) to a discussion of when an agent's intention
makes him guilty or worthy of acquittal. In that context, Mill seems to
see the question of lightness or wrongness and the question of guilt or
worthiness of acquittal, as one and the same question, as he moves
from the one to the other without any sign whatsoever that he thinks
he is changing the subject. In the passage in chapter II of Utilitarian-
ism and in the discussion of intentions and motives in his commentary
30
 Nor should one worry that he had not yet formulated that view, for chapter V was
actually composed before chapter II. See Berger, Happiness, Justice, and Freedom.
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on his father's work, Mill has in mind the more refined, chapter V
accounts of moral lightness and wrongness.31
Mill makes a strong claim about the connection between intentions
and the lightness or wrongness of action and denies that there is any
such connection between motives and morality. Taken in isolation,
such claims are puzzling, especially coming from a utilitarian. How-
ever, when we put Mill's striking claims in the context of his larger
theory, and in particular his account in chapter V of Utilitarianism
of Tightness and wrongness, as well as the context of his connection to
Bentham, Mill's remarks are intelligible and plausible. Admittedly,
the specific details of my reconstruction of how Mill might have
defended his claims are somewhat speculative, and perhaps Mill
would not have endorsed them all. The crucial point is that once one
sees just what Mill meant by 'right', "wrong", 'intend' and their
cognates, all he must do to defend his claims is show that it is sensible
to adopt practices of blame and punishment that individuate actions
in terms of intentions rather than motives. Even if Mill would not (or
should not) adopt the specific arguments for such practices canvassed
here, there may well be room for a range of other arguments for that
conclusion. In any case, the main burden of my argument has been to
show that Mill's claims can be made intelligible and plausible, though
whether they are sound will depend upon empirical questions. We
may, on empirical grounds, disagree with Mill about the relative im-
portance of intentions and motives for a utilitarian, but we should not
find his account of their relative importance philosophically puzzling.32
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 It might be objected that my proposal blurs the distinction between act-evaluation
and agent-evaluation, since calling an action right on my account amounts to claiming
that agents ought to be compelled to perform such actions. If this is a problem, then I
think it pretty clearly really is a problem for Mill, given his claims in Chapter V. In fact,
though, there is still room for an important distinction between act- and agent-evalu-
ation. Calling an action right is to evaluate the action, and to say that it the action is of
a type which ought, in general, to be compelled. The point of telling someone an action
is right is to get them to do it. Similarly, the point of telling someone what they did was
wrong is to get them not to do it in the future, and to do so by making them feel guilty.
By contrast, when we tell someone she is a bad person, as when we call someone a
coward, we are telling her not that any particular action of hers is such that she should
feel guilty about it, but that she should try to be a different kind of person. In this
case, the emotion we aim to produce is shame, rather than guilt, and the main point is
to criticize the motives which typically lead the agent to act, rather than to criticize some
particular action of hers. For a classic discussion of the distinction between guilt and
shame (and one which does not match exactly with my own), see John Rawls, A Theory
of Justice, Cambridge, MA, 1971, pt. III.
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